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Abstract 
Emergency communication networks provide the 
basis for preparing for, and responding to, manmade 
and natural disasters. With the increasing importance 
of information security, emergency network operators 
such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local 
and national governmental agencies, and traditional 
network operators must deal with the possibility of 
sabotage and hacking of such networks. A network 
interdiction modeling approach is proposed that can 
be utilized for planning purposes in order to identify 
and protect critical parts of the network infrastructure. 
These critical nodes or links represent opportunities 
where investment or "hardening" of such infrastructure 
may reduce or prevent reductions in network traffic 
flows created by nefarious actors prior, during, or 
after an emergency or disaster.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Recent disasters such as Superstorm Sandy in the 
U.S. in 2012 and Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 
2013 represent just a few examples of events where an 
affected populace was in dire need of assistance from a 
variety of disaster relief organizations and emergency 
responders. Response and relief can come from a 
variety of sources including governmental organizations 
(GOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such 
as the Red Cross, and the affected populace. All of 
these entities require a means to communicate and 
coordinate their activities in the affected region. 
Most often wireless networks, whether they are 
operational parts of the existing mobile network (cell 
phone network) in the affected region, RF-based 
communication networks of local fire and police 
departments, or ad hoc networks set up specifically for 
disaster relief, are relied upon heavily to support 
emergency responders and the local populace. Wireless 
networks offer the obvious advantage of mobility for 
emergency responders as well as built-in rechargeable 
power sources for such devices during possible times of 
power outages. 
This research's main contribution is the 
introduction of a network interdiction modeling 
approach in order to plan for and analyze possible 
disruptions in emergency communications created by 
the intentional, nefarious activities of would-be hackers 
or terrorists. These two groups, despite their motivation 
of profit, ideology, or other factors have the goal of 
disabling or disrupting emergency wireless 
communications thereby hampering emergency relief 
efforts and reducing the resiliency of the affected 
populace.  
The application of a network interdiction approach, 
as opposed to a more traditional information security 
risk modeling and analysis approach, provides a game-
theoretic view incorporating limitations of potential 
attackers. This modeling approach creates a scenario in 
which a potential attacker surveys a network's design 
and attempts to maximize damage subject to resource 
constraints. A would-be attacker's constraints could 
include limits on financial, manpower, and technical 
resources that are available for an attack. Our model 
essentially gives a network owner a rigorous model to 
aid in the decision of how and where to expend 
resources to "harden" a network in order to prevent an 
attack or mitigate damage from one.  
 
2. Emergency communications and 
resiliency  
 
     The notion of resiliency in an affected population 
following a disaster is intimately tied to the ability of 
members of this entity to communicate with one 
another, emergency responders, and the "outside 
world" beyond the affected region. As has been learned 
in disaster such as the Japanese earthquake and 
tsunami of 2011 and Superstorm Sandy of 2012, 
traditional mobile network infrastructures may not be 
operable post-disaster or be overwhelmed with traffic 
and essentially rendered unusable. During Superstorm 
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(Hurricane) Sandy in the United States, an average of 
about 25% of the fixed mobile network base stations in 
the affected area lost service [1] and population in parts 
of this region were without wireless mobile access for 
days to follow. It should be obvious that emergency 
responders such as fire and police agencies, regional 
and national governmental agencies such as FEMA, 
and even major mobile network operators such as 
Verizon Wireless and AT&T in the U.S., would benefit 
from improved planning and deployment of their 
emergency management resources and portable 
infrastructure along with the portion of any fixed 
wireless network architecture that remains operational. 
The ability of a nefarious actor such as a terrorist or 
hacker to disable one or more key network 
components, must be planned for within the scope of 
an emergency communications scenario. 
 
3. Emergency wireless communication 
network technologies  
 
     In order to understand how hackers or terrorists 
could disable a network used for emergency 
communications, one must examine the various 
technologies utilized in such networks. In particular, 
understanding that some networks are privately owned 
while others are operated by various governmental 
agencies is key to understanding their differences and 
their ability to survive a given disaster. It also helps to 
determine what type of traffic is granted priority on a 
heavily loaded wireless network following a disaster.  
     Private wireless networks that would be utilized in a 
disaster scenario would most likely be public cellular 
phone networks that allow for both voice and data 
communications. Base stations for such networks 
typically have a form of emergency power such as a 
generator or batteries that allow them to operate for 
some period of time in the event of a power failure. 
Unfortunately, the lifetime for generator or battery 
operations for a given base station is not more than a 
day or two. Such networks also suffer from the 
vulnerability of having their connections to the entire 
network cutoff through broken communication lines or 
disabled control stations that link several base stations 
together. An attacker could disable the backup power 
for a given network node (base station or controller 
station in a cellular network). Another possible way to 
affect the network would be to destroy or cut 
communication lines to/from network nodes. 
     Private networks do not necessarily need to give 
priority to the traffic of emergency responders, but 
generally do so thereby limiting the available capacity 
for network subscribers and others wishing to utilize 
them post-disaster. The ability of hackers to mimic 
such priority traffic, thereby reducing available 
capacity for true emergency traffic, represents one way 
such networks can be compromised. An analogy could 
be made that this type of attack would be the wireless 
equivalent of a traditional denial-of-service attack on a 
computer network. An attacker need not disable nodes 
or links on a network in order to disrupt emergency 
communications. 
     One method for ensuring that cellular wireless 
communications in a region affected by a disaster is 
available is to utilize portable mobile network base 
stations (BSs) that can be deployed when conditions 
are appropriate. Typically, cellular network providers 
maintain a cache of such devices that can be 
transported to a disaster-affected region and deployed 
in areas where the existing infrastructure has been 
destroyed or is overloaded with traffic. Having such 
devices available to first responders or an affected 
populace immediately following a disaster would be 
the ideal goal for a wireless cellular network operator. 
Unfortunately, this approach can be problematic from 
both a temporal and a logistical point of view. Often, 
such portable base stations must incur long transit 
times in order to be moved to an affected area. This is 
due to the fact that such devices are usually centrally 
stored to minimize inventory holding costs. Another 
potential problem is not having the required number of 
devices readily deployable to provide sufficient 
coverage for an affected area. This can hinder or delay 
relief efforts and create frustration among the affected 
populace that expects such networks to be continuously 
operable. 
     As wireless technologies advance, other options 
will become available for wireless network subscribers 
following a disaster. LTE-Direct (Long Term 
Evolution Direct) is an emerging standard that allows 
mobile network handsets to communicate with one 
another in addition to a fixed network base station. 
Such a standard would allow users to communicate 
through other users in order to reach an operable base 
station. The potential for hackers or terrorist to pose as 
a legitimate node in such a hybrid network architecture 
represents a potential threat. The application of 
technologies such as femto-cells, which utilize a fixed 
line broadband connection to act as a "mini" base 
station for mobile network handsets, represent other 
options that could be deployed post disaster by cellular 
network operators to facilitate emergency 
communications for an affected populace and 
emergency responders. The potential exists with these 
devices for hackers to offer their own “fake” 
connection points for collecting user traffic or to 
provide false traffic much the same way Wifi hotspots 
can be used for nefarious purposes. 
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     Other technologies that might be utilized by 
governmental agencies or aid (disaster relief) 
organizations for emergency communication networks 
include VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) 
networks that utilize satellite links for establishing 
local area networks in an affected region and HetNets 
(Heterogeneous Networks) which are a hybrid mix of 
wireless communication technologies deployed within 
a single framework. Such networks may fall under the 
general category of ad hoc networks in that their 
topological design is determined at the point of 
deployment. Such networks would represent a 
challenge for hackers or terrorists to disrupt due to this 
fact, but their ad hoc nature also creates less 
centralized control over network access. 
     Previous work in the literature addressing ad hoc 
network use for disaster recovery looks at technical 
details and not such issues as portable base station 
placement or required connectivity in an overall 
optimization framework. Unlike some of this previous 
work, we recognize that some fixed mobile network 
infrastructure existed prior to the disaster and may be 
optionally integrated into the model if still operating. 
A hacker or terrorist can add further damage to a 
surviving network and might even be able to disguise 
such damage as being a result of the disaster and not 
their sabotage.  Wireless networks operated by 
governmental agencies would necessarily be designed 
to withstand natural disasters to a certain extent, but 
probably not the intentional damage or intervention by 
terrorists or hackers in a post-disaster scenario. In 
particular, the Radio-Frequency (RF)-based nodes 
(repeaters, central offices, etc.) of local wireless 
networks built for fire, emergency/rescue, and police 
with a city or county may withstand damage from 
disasters better than cellular network towers in public 
networks due to their original design considerations. 
     Other types of wireless network architectures 
beyond public cellular and those utilized by 
fire/emergency/police exist. One of the relevant works 
on wireless network design that addresses disaster 
recovery is by Lu and coauthors [2]. They outline 
hybrid ad hoc network designs for disaster recovery 
using Wi-Fi, WiMax, and geostationary satellite 
technologies. It should be obvious from the mention of 
both WiMax and satellite technologies that the network 
architectures they propose assume no existing mobile 
network connectivity (functioning fixed BS's) to link to 
and require specialized WiMax and satellite 
equipment. Their work looked at 2 tier (Wi-Fi linked to 
Satellite) and 3 tier (Wi-Fi linked to WiMax linked to 
Satellite) architectures and merely proposed such 
hybrid network designs for disaster recovery without 
any notion of optimization. More recent work by Tsai 
and collaborators [3] provided an architecture design 
for applications utilized for emergency management. 
A technological example of a wireless emergency 
infrastructure in the U.S. would be low cost handsets 
that use unlicensed frequencies. They represent an 
inexpensive way for an affected populace to 
communicate during and after a disaster. These point-
to-point handsets are readily available in the U.S. at 
retail department stores in most cities and towns. FRS 
(Family Radio Service) handsets, which are essentially 
half duplex "walkie talkie" units that are sold for family 
and recreational use and have a useful range of a few 
hundred feet, are an example of this type of technology. 
A small rural community that encourages the purchase 
of such devices by its residents could be considered a 
public investment in an emergency communications 
infrastructure. Unfortunately, sole reliance on these 
inexpensive point-to-point mobile handsets for 
localized communications among volunteers acting as 
emergency response personnel post-disaster may not be 
a wise design choice. This is due to the possibility that 
the removal of any one node in the network may result 
in complete network failure if such a node acts as the 
sole intermediate node for relaying important 
information to other parts of the network. RF jamming 
or the sabotage of a handset's battery power source by a 
nefarious actor (interdictor) could seriously hinder such 
an ad hoc network architecture as well. However, not 
utilizing such an inexpensive ad hoc wireless 
technology may increase emergency network 
deployment costs significantly. The purchase of a more 
sophisticated trunked radio system for a small 
community could cost tens of thousands of dollars or 
more.  
One can therefore see that the investment in 
emergency communications is a balancing between 
available resources, the needs of emergency responders, 
and the requirements of the affected populace during 
and post-disaster. It is the intentional disruption of a 
network that we will model. In particular we look at the 
cost tradeoffs of investment in “hardening” wireless 
communication network given a level of cost that a 
nefarious actor (terrorist or hacker) is willing to spend 
in order to inflict damage on a given network.  
    
4. Network interdiction modeling  
 
A network interdiction modeling approach was chosen 
to model the intentional sabotage of emergency 
wireless networks prior to or during a crisis or disaster. 
Such a modeling approach tends to follow the process 
outlined by Smith [4].  In this process, the interdictor 
performs some interdiction actions on the network, 
such as removing nodes or links, subject to one or 
more budget constraints which represent scarce 
resources such as monetary funds, time, or manpower.  
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It is assumed that any nefarious organization or 
individual does not possess unlimited resources to 
carry out an attack. The scenario of interest in this 
work involves a would-be attacker that takes advantage 
of the conditions just prior to, during, or immediately 
following a natural disaster to inflict damage upon 
communication networks needed by emergency 
responders and the affected populace. For example, 
one can imagine a perpetrator lurking behind during 
the chaotic conditions of a pre-hurricane evacuation of 
a coastal area in order to disrupt power sources for 
mobile base stations or cut cabling to antennae for 
repeaters used by EDACS (Enhanced Digital Access 
Communication System) systems for fire, police and 
emergency responders. 
     After an interdictor takes some course of action in 
order to disrupt the wireless network(s), the operator, 
then responds by taking recourse actions on the 
network. This two stage process is similar to a 
Stackelberg game [4] and the actions of both a network 
provider and attacker can be viewed as nothing more 
than the equilibrium strategies of a two-player game. 
This is a zero-sum game in which the attacker 
(interdictor) is interested in lowering the operator's 
objective function as much as possible. This objective 
function is the normal throughput and operation of the 
wireless network when needed by emergency 
responders. From a game-theoretic point of view, if a 
network operator is interested in deploying a minimum 
cost wireless network to support emergency responders 
in an area that is prone to disasters (such as coastal 
areas subject to hurricanes, floods, and tsunamis), then 
the interdictor will look to maximize the minimum cost 
of the resulting network.  This perspective results in 
the interdictor playing a maximin strategy while the 
operator playing a minimax strategy.  Similarly, one 
may extend the two stage, maximin models, to three 
stage min-max-min models, in which the operator first 
designs and deploys the network, then the interdictor 
attacks the network, and finally the operator responds 
to the attack. 
If we move away from network deployment costs 
and instead consider the ability of a wireless network to 
perform during and after a disaster or emergency, then 
the following example may provide some additional 
insight. Consider the same nefarious organization as the 
interdictor that is interested in disrupting post-disaster 
telecommunications which only adds to the difficulties 
encountered by emergency responders and the affected 
populace. Given a network architecture, the nefarious 
organization or individual will have a budget that places 
an upper limit on the number of network components it 
may destroy or disable. For example, the attackers may 
disable or destroy at most  of  nodes due to this 
restriction. Also, it should noted that the model allows 
for nodes to vary in their nature and cost of removal, 
much the same way wireless communication networks 
can be pieced together in an ad hoc fashion from 
varying technologies post-disaster. As such, knowing 
that at most  nodes may be removed, the operator may 
choose a wireless telecommunications network 
composition that is resilient to  node failures by 
investing in additional network infrastructure or 
redundancy for nodes or links.   
The example provided above deals with network 
sabotage, but could just as easily apply to network 
hacking. An interdictor may pose as an emergency 
responder and relay false information to other 
responders. Another possibility is that the hacker 
utilizes location information being relayed to inflict 
damage on the populace, infrastructure, or property. To 
build upon the previous example, if unlicensed FRS 
units were utilized, an interdictor could pose as a 
volunteer emergency responder for very little cost or 
preparation. 
 
5. Specific network interdiction modeling  
 
     We begin this section by formulating a generic 
interdiction optimization model to determine the 
minimum cost network deployment strategy for a 
network owner or operator with three different 
communication technologies  that can be 
implemented in  locations for  nodes and the 
interdictor has a budget of  to remove nodes with a 
cost of  to remove a node of type .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please note that above ,  if 
the node at location  uses technology . Similarly, 
 if the node at location  using technology  is 
removed by the interdictor. The connectivity 
constraints are technology-specific, and as such, must 
be added for a given network architecture.  An 
example of a constraint might be the maximum number 
of users a node using a particular technology can 
provide service for in a specific location. 
 
    Unlike a fixed line infrastructure that could support 
large amounts of broadband traffic, if operational, 
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during and after a disaster, a wireless network would 
necessarily first support voice communications for 
emergency responders. Data traffic would be 
considered secondary for those same responders and 
possibly the affected populace. The network 
interdiction model's ability to deal with the varying 
technologies provides an advantage to this modeling 
approach. One only has to deal with the costs of 
creating and maintaining connectivity from the 
operator's viewpoint and the limitations on resources 
from the interdictor's viewpoint. 
     We have further developed this basic network 
interdiction model to allow for optimization utilizing 
the approach in [5]. A bi-level formulation of this 
model then requires the dual of the inner minimization 
to be taken and solved.  
 
Notation for the Model Formulation
 Parameters: 
o 𝑑𝑖 :The demand for node 𝑖 
o 𝐾𝑖 : The amount of cost required to bring down 
node 𝑖 
o 𝐶𝑂: The set of all central office locations 
o 𝐼: The set of all repeaters and sheriff locations 
o 𝐵: The budget of the attacker 
o 𝑠𝑖 : The cost to the defender for repairing a CO 
o 𝐶: The budget of the defender 
 Decision variables: 
o 𝑥𝑖 : The investment decision of the attacker, how 
much is put to attack node 𝑖 
o 𝑦𝑖 : The investment decision of the defender, how 
much is put to defend node 𝑖 
o 𝑓𝑖 : The remaining capacity of node 𝑖 
 
 
 
In order to properly bound this maximization during 
solving by standard optimization software, the notion 
of a budget for the defender (network operator or 
owner) had to be incorporated. Thus the model 
included budgets for both the network interdictor 
(attacker) and network defender (owner or operator). 
The resulting optimization for the derived network 
interdiction model yields very useful information 
encompassed in the decision variables of the inner dual 
formulation. The information resulting from the 
optimization identifies which network components 
 
Bilevel Formulation of the Network 
Interdiction Model
max
𝑦
min
𝑥 ,𝑓
 
 𝑑𝑖
𝑓𝑖
𝐾𝑖
+ ( 𝐶𝑂 −   𝑓𝑖/𝐾𝑖) ⋅  𝑑𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼𝑖∈𝐶𝑂𝑖∈𝐼∪𝐶𝑂
 
 
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑓𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 ∪ 𝐶𝑂 
 𝑓𝑖 ≤ 𝐾𝑖  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 ∪ 𝐶𝑂 
  𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝐵
𝑖∈𝐼∪𝐶𝑂
  
 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑦𝑖 + 𝐾𝑖  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑂 
 
 𝑦𝑖 +   
𝑓𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝑠𝑖 ≤ 𝐶
𝑖∈𝐶𝑂𝑖∈𝐼∪𝐶𝑂
 
 
  𝑦𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼∪𝐶𝑂
≤ 𝐶  
 𝑓𝑖
𝐾𝑖
≥
𝑓𝑖−1
𝐾𝑖−1
 
∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑂\{1} 
 𝑦, 𝑥, 𝑓 ∈ ℜ+  
 
 
 
 
Primal of the Inner Minimization
min
𝑥 ,𝑓 ,𝑤
 
 𝑑𝑖
𝑓𝑖
𝐾𝑖
+ ( 𝐶𝑂 −   𝑓𝑖/𝐾𝑖) ⋅  𝑑𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼𝑖∈𝐶𝑂
+   𝑤𝑖𝑀
𝑖∈𝐼∪𝐶𝑂𝑖∈𝐼∪𝐶𝑂
 
 
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝛼  𝑓𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 ∪ 𝐶𝑂 
(𝛿) 𝑓𝑖 ≤ 𝐾𝑖  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 ∪ 𝐶𝑂 
(𝛾)  𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝐵
𝑖∈𝐼∪𝐶𝑂
  
(𝛽) 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑦𝑖 + 𝐾𝑖  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑂 
(𝜎) 
 𝑦𝑖 +   
𝑓𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝑠𝑖 ≤ 𝐶
𝑖∈𝐶𝑂𝑖∈𝐼∪𝐶𝑂
 
 
 𝜌  𝑓𝑖
𝐾𝑖
≥
𝑓𝑖−1
𝐾𝑖−1
 
∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑂\{1} 
 𝑦, 𝑥, 𝑓 ∈ ℜ+  
 
Note that we added a term to the first constraint to ensure that the 
mathematical program is feasible. 
 
 
 
 
 
Dual of the Inner Minimization
 
 
max
𝛼 ,𝛽 ,𝛾 ,𝛿 ,𝜎 ,𝜌
 
 𝛼𝑖 𝐾𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖 +  𝛿𝑖𝐾𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼∪𝐶𝑂
+   𝛽𝑖 𝑦𝑖 + 𝐾𝑖 
𝑖∈𝐶𝑂
+ 𝛾 ⋅ 𝐵 + 𝜎  𝐶 −  𝑦𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼∪𝐶𝑂
  
𝑖∈𝐼∪𝐶𝑂
 
 
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 ≤ 𝑑𝑖/𝐾𝑖  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 
 
𝛼𝑖 +  𝛿𝑖 −
𝜌𝑖
𝐾𝑖
+
𝑠𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝜎 ≤
𝑑𝑖
𝐾𝑖
+  
𝑑𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼
  
𝑖 = 1 & 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑂 
 
𝛼𝑖 +  𝛿𝑖 −
𝜌𝑖
𝐾𝑖
+
𝜌𝑖−1
𝐾𝑖
+
𝑠𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝜎 ≤
𝑑𝑖
𝐾𝑖
+  
𝑑𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼
 
𝑖 ≠ 1, |𝐶𝑂| &  𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑂 
 
𝛼𝑖 +  𝛿𝑖 +
𝜌𝑖−1
𝐾𝑖
+
𝑠𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝜎 ≤
𝑑𝑖
𝐾𝑖
+  
𝑑𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼
 
𝑖 = |𝐶𝑂| &  𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑂 
 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾 ≤ 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 
 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛾 + 𝛽𝑖 ≤ 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑂 
 𝛼 ∈ ℜ;    𝛿, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜎 ∈ ℜ−;   𝜌 ∈ ℜ+   
 
 
 
were successfully attacked by the network interdictor 
(in that some traffic flow reduction was accomplished) 
with its budgeted resources and which network 
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components were successfully defended (no reduction 
in traffic flows) by the defender given its budgeted 
resources. This information provides useful insight for 
network planners/operators and would allow for a more 
insightful investment in network redundancy or 
"hardening" to prevent network disruption through 
sabotage or hacking during a disaster and its aftermath. 
 
Including the Budget for the Defender
max
𝛼 ,𝛽 ,𝛾 ,𝛿 ,𝜎 ,𝜌
 
 𝛼𝑖 𝐾𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖 +  𝛿𝑖𝐾𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼∪𝐶𝑂
+   𝛽𝑖 𝑦𝑖 + 𝐾𝑖 
𝑖∈𝐶𝑂
+ 𝛾 ⋅ 𝐵 + 𝜎  𝐶 −  𝑦𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼∪𝐶𝑂
  
𝑖∈𝐼∪𝐶𝑂
 
 
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 ≤ 𝑑𝑖/𝐾𝑖  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 
 
𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 −
𝜌𝑖
𝐾𝑖
+
𝑠𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝜎 ≤
𝑑𝑖
𝐾𝑖
+  
𝑑𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼
  
𝑖 = 1 & 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑂 
 
𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 −
𝜌𝑖
𝐾𝑖
+
𝜌𝑖−1
𝐾𝑖
+
𝑠𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝜎 ≤
𝑑𝑖
𝐾𝑖
+  
𝑑𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼
 
𝑖 ≠ 1, |𝐶𝑂| &  𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑂 
 
𝛼𝑖 +  𝛿𝑖 +
𝜌𝑖−1
𝐾𝑖
+
𝑠𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝜎 ≤
𝑑𝑖
𝐾𝑖
+  
𝑑𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼
 
𝑖 = |𝐶𝑂| &  𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑂 
 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾 ≤ 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 
 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛾 + 𝛽𝑖 ≤ 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑂 
  𝑦𝑖 ≤ 𝐶
𝑖∈𝐼∪𝐶𝑂
 
 
 𝛼 ∈ ℜ;    𝛿, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜎 ∈ ℜ−;   𝑦, 𝜌 ∈ ℜ+   
 
 
 
 
6. A case study region 
 
In order to better ascertain the usefulness of the 
interdiction model we developed, we are currently 
creating a case study of a region in order to apply the 
interdiction model for its emergency communication 
networks. The region we have chosen is the Southeast 
coast of the state of Florida in the United States and in 
particular, Miami-Dade County within this region. The 
region has some unique features with respect to its 
emergency response organizations, its vulnerability to 
hurricanes and severe weather, and its population 
density/dispersion. Although our original intent was to 
cover the four counties from Palm Beach County in the 
north to Monroe County in the south of this region, we 
have chosen to focus on one specific emergency 
management network which operates at the county-
wide level. In particular, Miami-Dade County within 
this region has the busiest 911 (centralized emergency 
management network/dispatch) in the Southeastern 
United States. The county also possesses the unique 
characteristic that most of the county's land area is 
patrolled/governed by its sheriff department. Only a 
handful of cities and municipalities in the county have 
their own police departments. Thus the emergency 
network we are using in our case study is the primary 
one for the entire country as opposed to a patchwork of 
many smaller networks for each city, town and 
municipality. 
The county's emergency network is utilized by the 
sheriff's department, but also serves both the fire and 
the emergency/rescue departments within the county's 
public services framework. Again, in order to create a 
working test case network interdiction model, we have 
chosen to narrow the focus to the network 
infrastructure serving the Miami-Dade Sheriff 
Department. The topology of this network is fairly 
simplistic, but it is representative of such networks for 
other counties, cities, and municipalities. It includes 
the central node of the 911 dispatch center located in 
Doral, Florida and 14 other nodes that are logically 
connected to it. This includes 8 sheriff stations spread 
across throughout the county and repeaters/antennas 
which extend the transmission range of the overall 
network. The network's logical topology can be seen in 
Figure 1. Figure 2 displays the locations of sheriff's 
offices and repeaters without the logical links. It can be 
seen from both figures that certain areas of Miami-
Dade County have no sheriff stations and limited 
network coverage. These include cities and 
municipalities such as Hialeah, Miami Beach and 
Miami that have their own police forces and fire and 
emergency management services. Although there exist 
overlapping communication channels between these 
other cities' departments and the county network, we 
do not consider such channels in our network 
interdiction modeling analysis. 
 
Figure 1 - Logical Network Topology – Central 
911 Dispatch Node at Doral
 
 
2514
Figure 2 - Repeater Locations (yellow stars) and 
Sheriff/Central Dispatch Locations (black boxes)
 
 
7. Current work  
 
We are currently testing various budget scenarios 
(both attacker and defender) for our network 
interdiction test model for the Miami-Dade Sheriff 
Department. We are utilizing published information on 
voice traffic on the Miami-Dade network that supports 
the sheriff department and have been able to segment 
the traffic into sheriff, fire, and EMS categories. We 
have estimated costs for network interference/sabotage 
from various information security websites on the 
Internet. For instance, an "off the shelf" 300 Megawatt 
EMP (electromagnetic pulse) device that is capable of 
jamming signals for a mobile network base station can 
be purchased for a few thousand dollars. A network 
interdictor might even resort to an unsophisticated and 
low cost methodology such as using a firearm or 
common explosive materials to disable antenna cables 
or power sources for repeaters or base stations. The 
notion of hacking a network is similar in nature. A 
hacker or hacking organization would have to invest in 
equipment or specific intelligence about the network 
and its physical and electronic security mechanisms in 
order to gain access to network components for 
hacking purposes.  
Recent optimization runs utilizing these realistic 
costs and budgets for the Miami-Dade County sheriff's 
network point to a diminishing return on investment 
for the defender (network owner or operator) and a 
theoretical limit as to how much a defender should 
spend in order to prevent network sabotage or hacking. 
The results of one set of optimization experiments 
where the defender's (Miami-Dade network) budget is 
incrementally increased, while holding the network 
interdictor's budget constant at a reasonable total, is 
shown in Figure 3 below. It can be seen from this 
graphic that despite the increasing budget for the 
defender, the ability to reduce further damage to nodes 
(which equates to a reduction in traffic flows at those 
nodes) in the network is exhausted at about $24,000. 
The practical interpretation of these optimization 
results are that the network owner should invest up to 
this amount of money to harden or prevent network 
attacks. Spending greater than this amount, given the 
assumed budget for the network interdictor, does not 
bring any additional protection or benefit.  Such a 
model and its resource expenditure guidelines would 
be useful for network planners and government 
officials.  
 
 
 
        Figure 3 - Nodes affected by the attacker on Y  
                           axis versus budget of the defender 
                           on X axis (Miami-Dade Sheriff) 
 
     We are currently running a series of experiments for 
the Miami-Dade sheriff department's portion of the 
county emergency communications network and will 
expand the scope for the county and region. We plan to 
utilize the modeling approach for fire and EMS 
network traffic for the county and eventually expand 
the geographical scope to include neighboring county 
networks in Southeast Florida in order to get a more 
regional planning viewpoint. 
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